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“In	  the	  fairy	  stories,	  naming	  is	  knowledge.	  When	  I	  know	  your	  name,	  I	  can	  call	  your	  
name,	  and	  when	  I	  call	  your	  name,	  you’ll	  come	  to	  me”.	  
	  –	  Jeanette	  Winterson	  (from	  “Lighthousekeeping”)	  	  





dependent	  on	  the	  ability	  to	  consistently	  and	  accurately	  name	  items	  (Lehrner,	  1993;	  Lumeng,	  Zuckerman,	  Cardinal	  &	  Kaciroti,	  2005),	  and	  differences	  in	  flavor	  and	  odor	  recognition	  between	  children	  and	  adults	  depends	  on	  adults’	  ability	  to	  name	  odors	  and	  flavors,	  rather	  than	  differences	  in	  sensory	  processing	  (Lehrner,	  Gluck	  &	  Laska,	  1999).	  	  Below	  I	  review	  work	  that	  addresses	  the	  role	  of	  basic-­‐level	  category	  names	  in	  visual	  perception	  and	  cognition.	  This	  literature	  has	  traditionally	  focused	  on	  situations	  where	  we	  have	  names	  that	  are	  not	  being	  actively	  employed	  during	  a	  task,	  and	  how	  adding	  names	  to	  novel	  stimuli	  enhances	  performance.	  However,	  recent	  work	  has	  begun	  to	  ask	  whether	  overt	  naming	  influences	  performance,	  even	  when	  the	  act	  of	  naming	  is	  redundant.	  One	  study	  in	  particular	  makes	  an	  especially	  provocative	  claim,	  suggesting	  that	  naming	  shifts	  the	  representation	  of	  the	  object	  stored	  in	  memory	  toward	  the	  category	  prototype,	  resulting	  in	  reduced	  performance	  on	  a	  recognition	  memory	  task.	  The	  goal	  of	  my	  dissertation	  is	  to	  evaluate	  the	  representational	  shift	  hypothesis	  and	  test	  alternatives	  to	  this	  claim.	  Ultimately	  these	  experiments	  show	  that	  naming	  does	  not	  necessarily	  shift	  the	  memory	  representation	  toward	  the	  prototype,	  but	  rather	  that	  naming	  at	  the	  basic-­‐level	  leads	  to	  a	  less	  salient	  and	  weaker	  memory	  representation	  because	  it	  is	  an	  instantiation	  of	  categorization	  that	  is	  performed	  relatively	  automatically1.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  















location	  in	  space.	  A	  verbal	  label	  is	  a	  label	  that	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  a	  word	  that	  can	  be	  written	  and	  spoken.	  A	  name	  is	  a	  verbal	  label	  by	  which	  an	  object	  is	  designated,	  called,	  or	  known	  at	  the	  category-­‐level.	  Thus,	  names	  and	  verbal	  labels	  are	  to	  some	  extent	  synonymous.	  However,	  a	  further	  distinction	  must	  be	  made	  between	  “labeling”	  and	  “naming”.	  An	  object	  can	  be	  labeled	  in	  an	  infinite	  number	  of	  ways.	  For	  example,	  the	  same	  chair	  might	  be	  labeled	  as	  “the	  red	  one”	  or	  	  “mine”.	  However,	  the	  name	  of	  the	  object	  always	  remains	  “chair”.	  Although	  there	  can	  be	  names	  at	  different	  levels	  of	  abstraction	  (e.g.,	  “fruit”	  vs.	  “apple”	  vs.	  “Granny	  Smith”),	  in	  general	  naming	  is	  more	  constrained	  than	  labeling,	  and	  people	  tend	  to	  use	  basic-­‐level	  names	  when	  naming	  objects	  that	  are	  typical	  exemplars	  of	  the	  basic-­‐level	  category	  (e.g.,	  Jolicoeur,	  Gluck	  &	  Kosslyn,	  1984).	  	  





This	  automatic	  access	  to	  names	  has	  consequences	  for	  perception	  and	  perceptual	  decision-­‐making.	  As	  early	  as	  one	  year	  of	  age	  enhanced	  oscillatory	  gamma-­‐band	  activity	  (measured	  with	  ERPs)	  is	  observed	  over	  visual	  cortex	  in	  response	  to	  objects	  for	  which	  the	  infant	  is	  familiar	  with	  the	  name	  compared	  with	  familiar	  objects	  for	  which	  the	  infant	  does	  not	  have	  a	  name	  (Gliga,	  Volein	  &	  Csibra,	  in	  press)2.	  	  In	  an	  fMRI	  study	  with	  adults,	  Tan	  and	  colleagues	  (2008)	  had	  participants	  discriminate	  between	  easy-­‐to-­‐name	  and	  difficult-­‐to-­‐name	  colour	  patches	  and	  found	  that	  perceptual	  discrimination	  for	  nameable	  colours	  evoked	  activation	  in	  regions	  involved	  in	  the	  colour	  naming	  localizer	  task.	  These	  results	  suggest	  that	  names	  and	  language	  can	  modulate	  perception	  and	  play	  a	  role	  in	  perceptual	  decisions	  when	  this	  information	  is	  available.	  Such	  neural	  data	  is	  consistent	  with	  behavioral	  work	  on	  categorical	  perception,	  which	  refers	  to	  the	  finding	  that	  discrimination	  between	  two	  perceptually	  similar	  stimuli	  is	  easier	  when	  the	  stimuli	  cross	  a	  category	  boundary	  (see	  Davidoff,	  2001;	  Masharov	  &	  Fischer,	  2006;	  Ozgen,	  2004;	  for	  reviews).	  Importantly,	  in	  studies	  using	  familiar	  stimuli	  the	  category	  boundary	  is	  determined	  by	  linguistic	  category,	  not	  perceptual	  similarity	  (Gilbert,	  Regier,	  Kay	  &	  Ivry,	  2006;	  2008;	  Goldstein	  &	  Davidoff,	  2008;	  Roberson	  &	  Davidoff,	  2000;	  Roberson,	  Davidoff	  &	  Braisby,	  2000;	  Roberson,	  Pak	  &	  Hanley,	  2008;	  Winawer,	  Witthoft,	  Frank,	  Wu,	  Wade	  &	  Boroditsky,	  2007).	  For	  example,	  given	  colour	  patches	  arranged	  in	  a	  spectrum	  from	  blue	  to	  green,	  discrimination	  is	  fastest	  for	  a	  pair	  of	  stimuli	  when	  one	  stimulus	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





is	  categorized	  as	  “blue”	  and	  the	  other	  stimulus	  is	  categorized	  as	  “green”	  despite	  equivalent	  distances	  in	  actual	  colour-­‐space	  between	  the	  pairs	  of	  stimuli.	  One	  explanation	  for	  categorical	  perception	  is	  that	  items	  in	  the	  same	  category	  are	  represented	  more	  similarly	  due	  to	  extensive	  practice	  categorizing	  these	  stimuli	  together	  (e.g.,	  Goldstone,	  1994;	  Harnad,	  1987).	  	  However,	  a	  recent	  study	  showed	  that	  belonging	  to	  the	  same	  conceptual	  category	  does	  not	  necessarily	  lead	  to	  differences	  in	  perceived	  similarity,	  as	  search	  for	  a	  novel	  target	  was	  faster	  when	  non-­‐targets	  were	  from	  the	  same	  linguistic	  category	  (e.g.,	  non-­‐targets	  were	  “B”	  and	  “b”)	  compared	  to	  different	  categories	  (e.g.,	  “B”	  and	  “p”),	  but	  perceptual	  judgements	  were	  equally	  fast	  for	  B-­‐b	  and	  B-­‐p	  pairs	  (Lupyan,	  2008b).	  These	  results	  suggest	  that	  effects	  that	  arise	  when	  objects	  are	  from	  the	  same	  linguistic	  category	  	  are	  not	  due	  to	  long-­‐term	  changes	  in	  the	  perceptual	  representation,	  where	  objects	  from	  the	  same	  category	  are	  represented	  as	  perceptually	  more	  similar.	  Nor	  is	  it	  sufficient	  that	  objects	  belong	  to	  different	  semantic	  categories.	  What	  is	  key	  is	  that	  these	  distinct	  semantic	  categories	  have	  different	  names.	  Indeed,	  the	  advantage	  in	  discrimination	  for	  cross-­‐category	  pairs	  is	  reduced	  when	  participants	  perform	  a	  concurrent	  verbal	  task	  (e.g.,	  holding	  a	  word	  in	  working	  memory),	  but	  not	  a	  concurrent	  visual	  task	  (e.g.,	  holding	  a	  visual	  pattern	  in	  working	  memory;	  Gilbert	  et	  al.,	  2006;	  2008;	  Roberson	  &	  Davidoff,	  2000;	  Winawer	  et	  al.,	  2007),	  implying	  that	  the	  ability	  to	  utilize	  category	  names	  is	  necessary	  for	  categorical	  perception	  in	  humans3.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





Supporting	  this	  claim,	  studies	  using	  visual	  search	  arrays	  where	  the	  target	  and	  distracters	  come	  from	  either	  the	  same	  or	  different	  linguistic	  category	  find	  larger	  categorical	  perception	  effects	  when	  the	  target	  is	  presented	  in	  the	  right	  visual	  field	  (Gilbert	  et	  al.,	  2006;	  2008)	  for	  rapid	  responses	  (Roberson	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  This	  right	  visual	  field	  advantage	  in	  categorical	  perception	  is	  presumed	  to	  arise	  because	  items	  presented	  in	  the	  right	  visual	  field	  have	  faster	  access	  to	  language	  processing	  in	  the	  left	  hemisphere.	  Interestingly,	  categorical	  perception	  of	  colours	  in	  toddlers	  is	  initially	  stronger	  for	  stimuli	  presented	  to	  the	  left	  visual	  field,	  but	  the	  right	  visual	  field	  advantage	  emerges	  once	  the	  toddlers	  have	  acquired	  the	  relevant	  colour	  terms	  (Franklin,	  Drivonikou,	  Bevis,	  Davies,	  Kay	  &	  Regier,	  2008;	  Franklin,	  Drivonikou,	  Clifford,	  Kay,	  Regier	  &	  Davies,	  2008).	  	  In	  addition	  to	  simply	  having	  names,	  declarative	  knowledge	  of	  names	  may	  influence	  perception.	  Mitterer	  and	  colleagues	  (2009)	  had	  Dutch	  and	  German	  participants	  categorize	  yellow	  and	  orange	  hues.	  These	  hues	  were	  presented	  on	  pictures	  of	  four	  common	  objects:	  a	  banana	  (prototypically	  yellow),	  a	  carrot	  (prototypically	  orange),	  a	  sock	  (with	  no	  strong	  colour	  associations)	  and	  the	  center	  circle	  of	  a	  traffic	  light.	  Critically,	  the	  center	  light	  of	  a	  traffic	  light	  is	  called	  “yellow”	  in	  German	  and	  “orange”	  in	  Dutch,	  even	  though	  the	  objective	  colour	  of	  the	  center	  light	  of	  a	  traffic	  light	  is	  the	  same	  in	  both	  countries.	  If	  an	  ambiguous	  yellow-­‐orange	  hue	  was	  presented,	  both	  groups	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  classify	  the	  hue	  as	  yellow	  if	  it	  was	  





presented	  on	  the	  prototypically	  yellow	  stimulus	  (and	  vice	  versa	  for	  orange).	  However,	  if	  an	  ambiguous	  hue	  was	  presented	  on	  the	  traffic	  light,	  Dutch	  participants	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  classify	  the	  stimulus	  as	  orange,	  and	  German	  participants	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  classify	  the	  stimulus	  as	  yellow.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  not	  just	  having	  different	  category	  names,	  but	  also	  declarative	  knowledge	  of	  the	  category	  name	  within	  a	  particular	  context,	  that	  can	  influence	  perception.	  	   	  





participants	  passively	  view	  the	  unfamiliar	  faces	  with	  names	  for	  one	  minute	  prior	  to	  the	  matching	  task,	  categorical	  perception	  is	  observed.	  Critically,	  familiarizing	  participants	  with	  the	  unknown	  faces	  without	  names	  prior	  to	  the	  experimental	  task	  does	  not	  produce	  this	  effect.	  Therefore,	  briefly	  associating	  stimuli	  with	  names	  is	  sufficient	  to	  influence	  perceived	  similarity.	  Similarly,	  Lupyan	  and	  Spivey	  (2008)	  found	  that	  visual	  search	  for	  a	  novel	  target	  among	  very	  similar	  novel	  distractors	  was	  more	  efficient	  when	  participants	  were	  instructed	  to	  think	  of	  the	  target	  and	  distractors	  as	  rotated	  digital	  2’s	  and	  5’s,	  demonstrating	  that	  ascribing	  familiar	  names	  to	  novel	  stimuli	  improves	  visual	  processing	  by	  making	  perceptually	  similar	  stimuli	  appear	  more	  different.	  	  Adding	  names	  to	  novel	  stimuli	  can	  also	  impact	  cognitive	  processes	  beyond	  the	  level	  of	  perception.	  For	  example,	  the	  presence	  of	  names	  can	  promote	  learning	  of	  novel	  categories	  even	  when	  the	  names	  are	  redundant	  and	  not	  necessary	  for	  the	  learning	  task.	  Lupyan,	  Rakison	  and	  McClelland	  (2007)	  had	  participants	  categorize	  novel	  “aliens”	  as	  those	  that	  should	  be	  approached	  or	  avoided.	  Critically,	  the	  responses	  being	  made	  in	  the	  training	  task	  were	  whether	  to	  move	  toward	  or	  away	  from	  the	  alien,	  so	  the	  response	  keys	  were	  not	  correlated	  with	  the	  categories4.	  After	  corrective	  feedback,	  a	  name	  for	  the	  category	  the	  alien	  belonged	  to	  was	  presented,	  or	  the	  alien	  moved	  to	  one	  side	  of	  the	  screen,	  representing	  the	  location	  where	  that	  category	  of	  alien	  lived.	  Participants	  who	  viewed	  a	  category	  name	  learned	  the	  categories	  faster	  and	  showed	  better	  transfer	  to	  new	  aliens	  not	  viewed	  during	  










are	  associated	  with	  the	  same	  concept	  (Anderson,	  1974;	  Anderson	  &	  Reder,	  1999;	  Reder	  &	  Anderson,	  1980;	  Reder,	  Donavos	  &	  Erickson,	  2002).	  	  















recognition	  memory	  by	  introducing	  new	  information	  that	  could	  help	  isolate	  the	  relevant	  items	  in	  memory.	  	  However,	  closer	  inspection	  of	  the	  data	  for	  the	  experiment	  with	  naming	  vs.	  the	  experiment	  without	  naming	  suggests	  that	  the	  difference	  between	  CC	  	  I	  and	  II	  










representation	  of	  the	  object	  that	  was	  just	  seen	  is	  altered	  by	  top-­‐down	  feedback	  invoked	  by	  the	  category	  label.	  The	  result	  is	  that	  when	  the	  same	  object	  is	  viewed	  during	  the	  recognition	  memory	  task,	  the	  object	  no	  longer	  matches	  the	  modified	  representation	  stored	  in	  memory.	  This	  study-­‐test	  mismatch	  leads	  to	  a	  false	  sense	  that	  the	  old	  object	  is	  new,	  and	  thus	  a	  lower	  hit	  rate.	  This	  effect	  is	  modulated	  by	  typicality	  because	  typical	  objects	  have	  more	  features	  in	  common	  with	  the	  category	  prototype,	  and	  thus	  more	  features	  that	  can	  be	  modified	  when	  the	  prototype	  is	  activated	  by	  the	  category	  name.	  	  



























REPLICATION	  &	  EXTENSION	  	  
Experiment	  1	  	   The	  purpose	  of	  Experiment	  1	  was	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  main	  result	  reported	  in	  Lupyan	  (2008)	  could	  be	  replicated.	  Experiment	  1	  will	  also	  be	  used	  as	  a	  basis	  of	  comparison	  for	  some	  later	  experiments.	  To	  this	  end,	  Experiment	  1	  was	  nearly	  identical	  to	  Lupyan	  (2008),	  with	  the	  exception	  that	  lures	  that	  were	  not	  matched	  to	  study	  items	  were	  also	  included	  because	  there	  is	  some	  evidence	  that	  false	  alarm	  rates	  to	  similar	  lures	  increase	  with	  hits	  more	  so	  when	  dissimilar	  lures	  are	  also	  tested	  (Malmberg,	  2008).	  Thus,	  Experiment	  1	  also	  tests	  whether	  the	  inclusion	  of	  non-­‐critical,	  dissimilar	  lures	  differentially	  impacts	  false	  alarm	  rates	  for	  named	  objects	  vs.	  objects	  for	  which	  preference	  is	  rated.	  	  	   Method	  	  





deviations	  from	  the	  mean	  on	  the	  naming	  task,	  and	  data	  from	  a	  fourth	  participant	  were	  discarded	  due	  to	  below	  chance	  performance	  in	  the	  memory	  task.	  	  	  
	  
Figure	  1.	  Examples	  of	  target-­‐lure	  pairs	  used	  in	  a)	  Experiments	  1,	  4-­‐6,	  b)	  Experiment	  2,	  and	  c)	  Experiment	  3.	  The	  top	  two	  examples	  show	  a)	  chairs,	  b)	  exemplar-­‐change	  pairs,	  or	  c)	  birds.	  The	  bottom	  two	  examples	  show	  a)	  lamps,	  b)	  state-­‐change	  pairs,	  or	  c)	  dogs.	  	  
	  





lures	  might	  be	  a	  different	  colour	  from	  the	  target,	  differ	  on	  a	  feature	  such	  as	  the	  presence	  or	  absence	  of	  arm	  rests,	  or	  have	  a	  different	  height-­‐width	  ratio	  (see	  Figure	  1a	  for	  examples).	  Pictures	  were	  randomly	  sorted	  into	  two	  sets,	  each	  containing	  ten	  target-­‐lure	  chair	  pairs	  and	  ten	  target-­‐lure	  lamp	  pairs.	  The	  20	  remaining	  pictures	  (ten	  from	  each	  category)	  were	  only	  presented	  at	  test	  as	  unrelated	  lures.	  	  	  





study	  phase.	  Task	  order	  and	  which	  object	  in	  a	  pair	  was	  the	  target	  or	  lure	  was	  also	  counterbalanced	  across	  participants.	  Prior	  to	  the	  experimental	  tasks	  participants	  were	  familiarized	  with	  the	  pace	  of	  the	  experiment	  with	  five	  practice	  trials.	  On	  the	  practice	  trials,	  participants	  saw	  pictures	  of	  different	  tables	  and	  pressed	  ‘1’	  if	  the	  table	  was	  round,	  and	  ‘2’	  if	  the	  table	  was	  square.	  	   After	  the	  study	  phase	  participants	  performed	  a	  surprise	  recognition	  memory	  task.	  They	  were	  informed	  that	  some	  of	  the	  pictures	  would	  be	  exactly	  the	  same	  as	  those	  they	  saw	  during	  the	  study	  phase,	  some	  of	  the	  pictures	  would	  be	  new	  but	  very	  similar	  to	  the	  pictures	  they	  saw	  before,	  differing	  only	  subtly	  in	  details	  like	  shape	  or	  colour,	  and	  some	  of	  the	  pictures	  would	  be	  brand	  new.	  Pictures	  were	  presented	  on	  the	  screen	  one	  at	  a	  time	  and	  participants	  were	  instructed	  to	  press	  ‘1’	  if	  the	  object	  was	  ‘old’	  and	  the	  exact	  same	  picture	  they	  saw	  before,	  and	  ‘2’	  if	  the	  object	  was	  ‘new’.	  Pictures	  remained	  on	  the	  screen	  until	  participants	  made	  a	  response.	  All	  100	  objects	  were	  presented	  in	  the	  recognition	  memory	  phase	  in	  random	  order.	  	  






Correct	  Response	  Times	  (and	  Standard	  Deviations)	  Recorded	  from	  the	  Onset	  of	  the	  Response	  
Probe	  During	  the	  Study	  Phase	  for	  Each	  Study	  Task	  in	  Experiments	  1-­5	  	   Study	  Task	   Response	  Times	  (ms)	  Experiment	  1	   Naming	  Preference	  	   230.43	  (102.42)	  338.24	  (113.88)	  Experiment	  2	   Naming	  Preference	   1002.91	  (111.47)	  1043.62	  (193.11)	  Experiment	  3	   Naming	  Preference	  Category	  Induction	  
174.04	  (76.76)	  267.90	  (94.98)	  175.48	  (64.09)	  Experiment	  4	   Category-­‐Matching	  Exemplar-­‐Matching	   315.94	  (143.00)	  323.95	  (137.00)	  Experiment	  5	   Naming	  Preference	  Colour	  Judgement	  
233.52	  (74.16)	  347.82	  (66.98)	  253.92	  (75.05)	  	   Results	  	  	  





6.187,	  p	  <	  .001)	  indicating	  that	  responding	  in	  this	  task	  was	  not	  random.	  However,	  naming	  responses	  were	  significantly	  more	  reliable	  than	  preference	  responses	  (86.77%	  vs.	  78.46%;	  t15	  =	  2.545,	  p	  <	  .05).	  Correct	  naming	  responses	  (recorded	  from	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  response	  probe)	  were	  also	  significantly	  faster	  than	  preference	  judgements	  (t15	  =	  6.291,	  p	  =	  .001;	  see	  Table	  1).	  	  	  
	  
Figure	  2.	  a)	  Overall	  memory	  performance	  (d’)	  and	  b)	  hit	  and	  false	  alarm	  rates	  on	  the	  recognition	  memory	  test	  for	  objects	  that	  were	  named	  vs.	  objects	  for	  which	  preference	  was	  rated	  in	  Experiment	  1.	  Error	  bars	  show	  95%	  confidence	  intervals	  for	  the	  paired-­‐sample	  t-­‐test.	  Error	  bars	  for	  false	  alarms	  for	  unrelated	  lures	  are	  standard	  error	  of	  the	  mean.	  
	  





repeated	  measures	  ANOVA	  on	  false	  alarm	  rates	  (naming	  vs.	  preference	  vs.	  unrelated	  lures)	  was	  significant	  (F2,30	  =	  19.911,	  p	  <	  .001),	  however	  post-­‐hoc	  tests	  revealed	  that	  this	  effect	  arose	  because	  false	  alarms	  for	  named	  objects	  and	  preference	  objects	  were	  both	  significantly	  higher	  than	  false	  alarms	  to	  unrelated	  lures	  (ps	  <	  .001),	  but,	  critically,	  did	  not	  differ	  from	  each	  other.	  A	  similar	  repeated	  measures	  ANOVA	  on	  correct	  response	  times	  (RTs)	  revealed	  no	  differences	  in	  RTs	  between	  named	  objects,	  objects	  for	  which	  preference	  was	  rated,	  and	  unrelated	  lures	  (see	  Table	  2).	  	  	  Table	  2.	  
Correct	  Response	  Times	  (and	  Standard	  Deviations)	  on	  the	  Recognition	  Memory	  Test	  for	  
Objects	  Presented	  in	  Each	  Study	  Task	  in	  Experiments	  1,	  3-­5.	  	   Study	  Task	   Response	  Times	  (ms)	  Experiment	  1	   Naming	  Preference	  	  Unrelated	  Lures	  
1125.69	  (237.24)	  1102.78	  (243.17)	  1133.82	  (285.59)	  Experiment	  3	   Naming	  Preference	  Category	  Induction	  
1343.50	  (538.24)	  1303.05	  (616.22)	  1248.82	  (459.12)	  Experiment	  4	   Category-­‐Matching	  Exemplar-­‐Matching	   1231.04	  (435.55)	  1080.33	  (314.24)	  Experiment	  5	   Naming	  Preference	  	  Colour	  Judgement	  





Typicality	  Effects	  at	  Test	  Average	  typicality	  ratings	  for	  chairs	  and	  lamps	  was	  3.00	  and	  2.68,	  respectively.	  The	  difference	  in	  typicality	  ratings	  for	  chairs	  and	  lamps	  was	  not	  significant.	  	  	  
	  










how	  they	  influenced	  subsequent	  memory,	  but	  also	  differed	  in	  how	  fast	  and	  reliable	  they	  were	  during	  the	  study	  phase.	  Naming	  responses	  were	  significantly	  faster	  and	  more	  reliable	  than	  preference	  judgements.	  The	  implications	  of	  these	  differences	  in	  study	  phase	  performance	  are	  considered	  in	  Chapter	  4.	  	  Unlike	  Lupyan	  (2008),	  the	  relationship	  between	  typicality	  and	  hit	  rate	  did	  not	  differ	  between	  named	  objects	  and	  objects	  for	  which	  preference	  was	  rated,	  although	  there	  is	  a	  trend	  in	  this	  direction	  (the	  correlation	  is	  significant	  for	  named	  objects	  but	  not	  preference	  objects).	  Effects	  of	  typicality	  at	  test	  for	  all	  subsequent	  experiments	  are	  reported	  in	  Appendix	  A	  and	  are	  considered	  further	  in	  the	  General	  Discussion.	  	   Experiment	  1	  established	  that	  the	  difference	  in	  recognition	  memory	  between	  objects	  that	  are	  named	  and	  objects	  for	  which	  preference	  is	  rated	  at	  study	  is	  replicable.	  Because	  Experiment	  1	  was	  nearly	  identical	  to	  the	  main	  experimental	  design	  of	  Lupyan	  (2008),	  these	  data	  will	  be	  used	  as	  a	  comparison	  for	  later	  experiments	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  number	  of	  basic-­‐level	  categories	  in	  the	  stimulus	  set	  influences	  recognition	  memory	  performance	  in	  this	  paradigm	  (Experiment	  2)	  and	  whether	  different	  encoding	  tasks	  produce	  the	  same	  quantitative	  effects	  as	  naming	  (Experiment	  4).	  	  	  










less	  similar	  to	  the	  studied	  pictures.	  Thus,	  Experiment	  2	  also	  tests	  whether	  the	  type	  of	  lure	  being	  used	  influences	  rates	  of	  false	  memory	  or	  general	  recognition	  memory	  performance	  in	  this	  paradigm	  by	  including	  both	  matched	  lures	  like	  those	  used	  in	  Lupyan	  (2008)	  and	  Experiment	  1	  and	  lures	  that	  are	  just	  categorically	  related	  to	  the	  targets.	  
	  Method	  	  
Participants	  	   Seventeen	  Vanderbilt	  University	  undergraduates	  (2	  male;	  mean	  age	  19.1	  years)	  participated	  in	  exchange	  for	  course	  credit.	  Data	  from	  one	  participant	  were	  discarded	  for	  naming	  accuracy	  that	  was	  more	  than	  two	  standard	  deviations	  below	  the	  mean.	  	  





but	  noticeable	  way.	  There	  were	  40	  exemplar	  pairs	  and	  40	  state	  pairs,	  and	  each	  pair	  consisted	  of	  an	  object	  from	  a	  unique	  basic-­‐level	  category.	  Stimuli	  were	  randomly	  divided	  into	  two	  sets	  with	  an	  equal	  number	  of	  exemplar	  and	  state	  pairs	  in	  each	  set.	  The	  object	  set	  assigned	  to	  each	  study	  task	  was	  counterbalanced	  across	  participants.	  	  





the	  test	  phase	  immediately	  followed	  the	  study	  phase,	  the	  test	  phase	  in	  Experiment	  2	  was	  completed	  approximately	  30	  minutes	  after	  the	  study	  phase.	  During	  this	  time	  participants	  took	  part	  in	  another	  unrelated	  experiment.	  	  Participants	  were	  familiarized	  with	  the	  pace	  of	  the	  experiment	  with	  five	  practice	  trials	  that	  showed	  pictures	  of	  chairs	  and	  lamps.	  Participants	  were	  asked	  to	  press	  ‘1’	  if	  the	  picture	  was	  a	  chair,	  and	  ‘2’	  if	  the	  picture	  was	  a	  lamp.	  	   	  To	  code	  correct	  responses	  in	  the	  naming	  task,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  experiment	  participants	  were	  given	  a	  sheet	  that	  showed	  images	  of	  all	  the	  target-­‐lure	  pairs	  used	  in	  the	  experiment	  and	  were	  asked	  to	  write	  the	  name	  for	  each	  pair	  of	  objects.	  Correct	  responses	  were	  coded	  based	  on	  how	  participants	  named	  the	  objects	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  experiment.	  	   Results	  	  
Study	  Phase	  	   Average	  accuracy	  on	  the	  naming	  task	  was	  88.5%	  (SD	  =	  6.57).	  Because	  each	  object	  was	  presented	  only	  once	  during	  the	  study	  phase	  it	  was	  not	  possible	  to	  compute	  reliability	  scores.	  There	  was	  no	  difference	  in	  correct	  RTs	  between	  the	  two	  tasks	  in	  the	  study	  phase	  (see	  Table	  1).	  	  	  





Task	  (naming	  vs.	  preference	  judgement)	  were	  performed	  on	  d’,	  correct	  RTs,	  hit	  rate	  and	  false	  alarm	  rate.	  	  	  





Hit	  rates	  were	  lower	  for	  named	  objects	  vs.	  preference	  objects	  (F1,	  15	  =	  14.006,	  
MSE	  =	  .008,	  p	  <	  .01).	  Paired-­‐sample	  t-­‐tests	  revealed	  a	  significant	  difference	  in	  hits	  between	  objects	  presented	  in	  the	  naming	  vs.	  preference	  study	  tasks	  for	  objects	  paired	  with	  both	  exemplar	  lures	  (t15	  =	  2.815,	  p	  =	  .013)	  and	  state	  lures	  (t15	  =	  2.522,	  p	  <	  .05).	  	  There	  were	  more	  false	  alarms	  for	  state	  lures	  compared	  with	  exemplar	  lures	  (F1,	  15	  =	  21.447,	  MSE	  =	  .016,	  p	  <	  .001).	  Paired-­‐sample	  t-­‐tests	  revealed	  no	  significant	  differences	  in	  false	  alarm	  rates	  between	  study	  tasks	  for	  either	  lure	  type.	  	  	  Table	  3.	  
Correct	  Response	  Times	  (and	  Standard	  Deviations)	  on	  the	  Recognition	  Memory	  Test	  for	  State	  
and	  Exemplar	  Target-­Lure	  Pairs	  Presented	  During	  Naming	  and	  Preference	  Study	  Tasks	  in	  
Experiment	  2.	  Study	  Task	   Lure	  Type	   Response	  Times	  (ms)	  Naming	   State	   1256.73	  (408.18)	  	   Exemplar	   1189.62	  (407.91)	  Preference	   State	   1139.73	  (367.59)	  	   Exemplar	   1166.75	  (375.82	  	   Correct	  RTs	  for	  all	  combinations	  of	  study	  task	  and	  lure	  type	  are	  reported	  in	  Table	  3.	  The	  interaction	  between	  Lure	  Type	  and	  Study	  Task	  approached	  significance	  in	  correct	  RTs	  (F1,	  15	  =	  4.384,	  MSE	  =	  8084.932,	  p	  =	  .054).	  Although	  the	  main	  effect	  of	  Study	  Task	  was	  significant	  (F1,	  15	  =	  17.668,	  MSE	  =	  4428.952,	  p	  =	  .001),	  paired-­‐sample	  





correct	  RTs	  to	  objects	  from	  the	  preference	  block	  for	  state	  lure	  pairs	  only	  (t15	  =	  3.967,	  p	  =	  .001).	  	  	  
All	  Unique	  Categories	  vs.	  Two	  Categories	  	   Only	  data	  from	  state	  lure	  pairs	  were	  used	  to	  compare	  with	  Experiment	  1	  because	  these	  lures	  are	  more	  similar	  to	  the	  kind	  of	  lures	  used	  in	  that	  experiment.	  A	  2	  x	  2	  mixed-­‐factor	  ANOVA	  on	  overall	  performance	  (d’)	  with	  within-­‐subjects	  factor	  of	  Study	  Task	  (naming	  vs.	  preference)	  and	  Experiment	  (Experiment	  1	  vs.	  Experiment	  2)	  as	  a	  between-­‐subjects	  factor	  revealed	  a	  main	  effect	  of	  Study	  Task	  (F1,	  30	  =	  28.216,	  

































	   The	  following	  two	  experiments	  will	  test	  whether	  the	  reduction	  in	  recognition	  memory	  performance	  following	  naming	  observed	  in	  Lupyan	  (2008)	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  basic-­‐level	  categorization	  as	  opposed	  to	  overt	  naming	  by	  using	  tasks	  where	  participants	  must	  consider	  category	  membership	  (Experiment	  3)	  or	  attend	  to	  category-­‐level	  information	  (Experiment	  4)	  without	  requiring	  an	  overt	  naming	  response.	  	  	  





where	  the	  judgement	  being	  made	  (e.g.,	  “is	  the	  animal	  young?”)	  encouraged	  focusing	  on	  item-­‐specific	  perceptual	  features,	  or	  compared	  with	  passive	  viewing.	  	  In	  Experiment	  3	  participants	  performed	  three	  tasks	  at	  study:	  naming,	  preference	  and	  category	  induction.	  Birds	  and	  dogs	  were	  used	  as	  stimuli	  (as	  opposed	  to	  chair	  and	  lamps)	  because	  there	  is	  evidence	  that	  category	  induction	  is	  stronger	  for	  natural	  categories	  compared	  to	  artifacts	  (e.g.,	  Gelman	  &	  Markman,	  1986,	  1987).	  If	  the	  category	  induction	  task	  leads	  to	  an	  increase	  in	  false	  alarms,	  while	  the	  naming	  task	  leads	  to	  a	  decrease	  in	  hits,	  relative	  to	  preference	  judgements,	  this	  would	  suggest	  that	  the	  effect	  of	  naming	  is	  distinct	  from	  memory	  effects	  related	  to	  basic-­‐level	  categorization.	  	  	   Method	  	  
Participants	  	   Eighteen	  Vanderbilt	  University	  undergraduates	  (5male;	  mean	  age	  20	  years),	  participated	  in	  exchange	  for	  course	  credit.	  Data	  from	  one	  participant	  were	  discarded	  for	  below	  chance	  performance	  on	  the	  memory	  test.	  Data	  from	  two	  more	  participants	  were	  discarded	  for	  accuracy	  on	  the	  category	  induction	  task	  that	  was	  more	  than	  two	  standard	  deviations	  below	  the	  mean.	  	  





PhotoShop	  such	  that	  each	  image	  showed	  a	  single	  dog	  or	  bird	  on	  a	  white	  background.	  There	  were	  21	  pairs	  of	  dog	  and	  bird	  pictures,	  where	  each	  target	  dog	  or	  bird	  was	  matched	  with	  a	  critical	  lure.	  Lures	  differed	  from	  targets	  in	  small	  but	  noticeable	  ways.	  Target-­‐lure	  pairs	  consisted	  of	  dogs	  of	  the	  same	  breed	  or	  birds	  of	  the	  same	  species	  (see	  Figure	  1c	  for	  examples).	  A	  given	  breed	  or	  species	  was	  only	  used	  to	  create	  one	  target-­‐lure	  pair.	  One	  additional	  bird	  and	  dog	  image	  were	  created	  to	  use	  as	  an	  example	  during	  the	  instructions	  that	  preceded	  the	  category	  induction	  block.	  This	  bird	  and	  dog	  were	  not	  the	  same	  breed/species	  as	  any	  of	  the	  target-­‐lure	  pairs,	  and	  this	  image	  was	  not	  presented	  at	  test.	  Images	  were	  sorted	  into	  three	  sets	  of	  14	  pairs	  (seven	  dog	  pairs,	  seven	  bird	  pairs).	  For	  each	  participant	  an	  object	  set	  was	  assigned	  to	  each	  of	  the	  three	  study	  tasks.	  The	  object	  set	  assigned	  to	  each	  task,	  task	  order,	  which	  object	  in	  the	  pair	  was	  the	  target	  and	  which	  was	  the	  lure	  were	  all	  counterbalanced	  across	  participants.	  The	  target	  category	  in	  the	  category	  induction	  task	  was	  randomized,	  such	  that	  the	  target	  was	  “dog”	  for	  half	  of	  the	  subjects	  and	  “bird”	  for	  the	  other	  half.	  	  





block,	  participants	  were	  instructed	  to	  determine	  which	  other	  animals	  also	  have	  beta	  cells.	  They	  were	  instructed	  to	  press	  ‘1’	  if	  they	  thought	  the	  animal	  in	  the	  picture	  had	  beta	  cells,	  and	  ‘2’	  if	  they	  thought	  the	  animal	  did	  not	  have	  beta	  cells.	  Correct	  responses	  were	  based	  on	  category	  membership,	  such	  that	  if	  a	  dog	  was	  presented	  during	  the	  instructions,	  participants	  should	  have	  responded	  that	  all	  dogs,	  but	  no	  birds,	  have	  beta	  cells.	  Corrective	  feedback	  (the	  word	  “correct”	  or	  “incorrect”	  presented	  for	  500ms)	  was	  provided	  after	  each	  trial	  to	  ensure	  that	  participants	  learned	  to	  make	  the	  induction	  on	  this	  basis.	  Task	  blocks	  were	  repeated	  twice	  during	  the	  study	  phase.	  Prior	  to	  the	  experimental	  tasks	  participants	  were	  familiarized	  with	  the	  pace	  of	  the	  experiment	  with	  five	  practice	  trials	  that	  were	  identical	  to	  the	  practice	  trials	  in	  Experiment	  1.	  	   After	  the	  study	  phase	  participants	  performed	  a	  surprise	  recognition	  memory	  task	  that	  was	  identical	  to	  Experiment	  2.	  All	  84	  objects	  were	  presented	  in	  the	  recognition	  memory	  phase	  in	  random	  order.	  
	   Results	  	  





significant	  differences	  in	  RTs	  between	  tasks	  (F2,	  28	  =	  15.628,	  MSE	  =	  2775.825,	  p	  <	  .001;	  see	  Table	  1).	  Paired-­‐sample	  t-­‐tests	  indicated	  that	  RTs	  to	  rate	  preference	  were	  significantly	  slower	  than	  RTs	  on	  the	  naming	  task	  (t14	  =	  4.263,	  p	  =	  .001)	  and	  the	  category	  induction	  task	  (t14	  =	  4.473,	  p	  =	  .001).	  RTs	  did	  not	  differ	  between	  the	  naming	  and	  category	  induction	  tasks.	  	  





were	  significantly	  more	  false	  alarms	  for	  objects	  studied	  in	  the	  preference	  block	  compared	  with	  objects	  that	  were	  named	  (t14	  =	  2.167,	  p	  <	  .05).	  	   Study	  task	  did	  not	  have	  a	  significant	  effect	  on	  correct	  RTs	  (see	  Table	  2).	  	  
	  










Experiment	  4	  Experiment	  4	  provides	  a	  second	  test	  of	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  impaired	  recognition	  memory	  following	  naming	  can	  also	  arise	  due	  to	  basic-­‐level	  categorization	  on	  its	  own.	  In	  this	  experiment	  participants	  performed	  a	  sequential	  matching	  task	  with	  chairs	  and	  lamps.	  In	  one	  block	  participants	  were	  instructed	  to	  judge	  whether	  two	  sequentially	  presented	  items	  were	  from	  the	  same	  category	  (category-­‐matching);	  attending	  to	  category-­‐level	  information	  may	  be	  similar	  to	  naming	  since	  this	  is	  the	  level	  at	  which	  the	  objects	  were	  being	  named	  in	  the	  previous	  experiments.	  In	  the	  second	  block	  participants	  were	  instructed	  to	  judge	  whether	  two	  sequentially	  presented	  items	  were	  the	  exact	  same	  exemplar	  (exemplar-­‐matching),	  requiring	  attention	  to	  the	  details	  of	  the	  exemplar	  itself;	  this	  may	  be	  similar	  to	  preference	  judgements	  because	  of	  the	  requirement	  to	  consider	  the	  specifics	  of	  the	  presented	  object	  –	  this	  is	  a	  chair	  vs.	  I	  like	  this	  chair.	  Importantly,	  two	  items	  were	  presented	  on	  every	  trial	  and	  whether	  the	  second	  item	  was	  a	  chair	  or	  lamp	  did	  not	  correlate	  with	  whether	  the	  correct	  response	  was	  “same”	  or	  “different”,	  making	  it	  impossible	  for	  participants	  to	  re-­‐map	  the	  response	  keys	  as	  “chair”	  and	  “lamp”.	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Stimuli	  	   Stimuli	  were	  144	  colour	  pictures	  of	  chairs	  and	  lamps	  (72	  from	  each	  category;	  36	  target-­‐lure	  pairs)	  that	  were	  obtained	  in	  the	  same	  manner	  as	  Experiment	  1.	  Pictures	  were	  sorted	  into	  four	  sets.	  Two	  sets	  contained	  20	  target-­‐lure	  pairs	  and	  were	  designated	  as	  “target	  sets”.	  Two	  other	  sets	  contained	  16	  target-­‐lure	  pairs	  and	  were	  designated	  as	  “non-­‐critical	  sets”.	  One	  target	  set	  and	  one	  non-­‐critical	  set	  were	  assigned	  to	  the	  category-­‐matching	  block	  and	  exemplar-­‐matching	  block	  for	  each	  participant.	  Set	  assignment	  was	  counterbalanced.	  	   During	  the	  study	  phase	  both	  target	  and	  lure	  objects	  from	  the	  non-­‐critical	  set	  were	  presented	  once.	  Only	  the	  target	  items	  from	  the	  target	  sets	  were	  presented	  (assignment	  as	  a	  target	  or	  lure	  was	  counterbalanced),	  and	  these	  objects	  were	  displayed	  twice,	  with	  both	  presentations	  in	  the	  same	  trial.	   	  	  
Procedure	  










examples	  of	  same	  and	  different	  trials	  for	  each	  type	  of	  matching	  judgement	  so	  they	  were	  aware	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  subtle	  differences	  that	  would	  need	  to	  be	  detected	  during	  the	  exemplar-­‐matching	  block.	  	   	  
	  





	   Matching	  blocks	  were	  followed	  by	  a	  surprise	  recognition	  memory	  test	  that	  was	  identical	  to	  the	  previous	  experiments.	  Recognition	  memory	  was	  only	  tested	  for	  objects	  presented	  on	  critical	  target	  trials,	  resulting	  in	  a	  total	  of	  80	  test	  trials	  (the	  20	  target	  set	  items	  from	  each	  study	  block	  and	  their	  matched	  lures).	  
	   Results	  	  
Study	  Data	  	   Accuracy	  was	  significantly	  higher	  for	  category-­‐matching	  (93%;	  SD	  =	  3.61)	  vs.	  exemplar-­‐matching	  (87%;	  SD	  =	  4.61;	  t19	  =	  4.46,	  p	  <	  .001).	  Correct	  RTs	  did	  not	  differ	  between	  tasks	  (see	  Table	  1).	  
	  





(t19	  =	  4.66,	  p	  <	  .001).	  Unexpectedly,	  the	  difference	  in	  false	  alarm	  rates	  was	  also	  driven	  by	  more	  false	  alarms	  for	  items	  in	  the	  exemplar-­‐matching	  vs.	  category	  matching	  block	  (t19	  =	  2.90,	  p	  <	  .01).	  	  
	  
Figure	  8.	  a)	  Overall	  performance	  (d’)	  and	  b)	  hit	  and	  false	  alarm	  rates	  on	  the	  recognition	  memory	  test	  for	  objects	  presented	  in	  the	  category-­‐matching	  and	  exemplar-­‐matching	  study	  blocks	  in	  Experiment	  4.	  Error	  bars	  show	  95%	  confidence	  intervals	  for	  the	  paired-­‐sample	  t-­‐tests.	  	  





worse	  for	  objects	  that	  were	  named	  compared	  with	  objects	  that	  were	  matched	  at	  the	  category	  level,	  this	  would	  suggest	  that	  although	  category-­‐matching	  and	  exemplar-­‐matching	  led	  to	  the	  same	  qualitative	  results	  as	  naming	  and	  preference,	  naming	  influences	  recognition	  memory	  more	  than	  basic-­‐level	  categorization.	  	   A	  2	  x	  2	  mixed-­‐factor	  ANOVA	  with	  within-­‐subjects	  factor	  Task	  (naming/category-­‐matching	  vs.	  preference/exemplar-­‐matching)	  and	  Experiment	  (Experiment	  1	  vs.	  Experiment	  4)	  as	  a	  between-­‐subjects	  factor	  revealed	  a	  significant	  main	  effect	  of	  Task	  (F1,	  34	  =	  34.937,	  MSE	  =	  .130,	  p	  <	  .001),	  a	  main	  effect	  of	  Experiment	  (F1,	  34	  =	  19.677,	  MSE	  =	  .199,	  p	  <	  .001)	  and	  a	  significant	  interaction	  between	  Task	  and	  Experiment	  (F1,	  34	  =	  11.618,	  MSE	  =	  .130,	  p	  <	  .01),	  such	  that	  the	  difference	  in	  recognition	  memory	  performance	  between	  study	  tasks	  was	  smaller	  in	  Experiment	  4	  than	  Experiment	  1.	  Independent	  samples	  t-­‐tests	  comparing	  performance	  on	  naming	  vs.	  category-­‐matching	  and	  preference	  vs.	  exemplar	  matching	  revealed	  that	  performance	  was	  significantly	  higher	  for	  objects	  in	  the	  preference	  condition	  in	  Experiment	  1	  compared	  with	  objects	  that	  were	  matched	  at	  the	  exemplar	  level	  in	  Experiment	  4	  (t1,	  





vs.	  the	  preference	  judgement	  task,	  rather	  than	  a	  difference	  in	  performance	  for	  objects	  in	  the	  naming	  vs.	  category-­‐matching	  tasks.	  	  
	  
Figure	  9.	  Comparison	  of	  overall	  memory	  performance	  (d’)	  between	  Experiments	  4	  (category-­‐matching	  and	  exemplar-­‐matching	  study	  tasks)and	  Experiment	  1	  (naming	  and	  preference	  study	  tasks).	  Error	  bars	  show	  95%	  confidence	  intervals	  of	  the	  independent-­‐sample	  t-­‐tests.	  






























DEPTH	  OF	  PROCESSING	  ACCOUNT	  OF	  THE	  NAMING	  EFFECT	  















includes	  a	  classic	  depth	  of	  processing	  manipulation	  (surface-­‐level	  judgement)	  in	  addition	  to	  naming	  and	  preference	  study	  tasks	  to	  explore	  whether	  recognition	  memory	  performance	  adheres	  to	  predictions	  based	  on	  depth	  of	  processing.	  Experiment	  6	  investigates	  whether	  differences	  in	  performance	  between	  naming	  and	  preference	  are	  driven	  by	  impairment	  following	  naming	  or	  improvement	  following	  preference	  judgements.	  	  





judgements	  will	  be	  lower	  than	  performance	  following	  preference	  judgements	  because	  the	  colour	  judgement	  is	  a	  shallow	  processing	  task	  while	  preference	  involves	  deeper	  encoding	  –	  participants	  must	  consider	  why	  they	  like	  the	  object,	  producing	  a	  self-­‐reference	  effect	  (Symons	  &	  Johnson,	  1997).	  Thus,	  a	  depth	  of	  processing	  account	  predicts	  a	  gradient	  of	  recognition	  memory	  performance	  with	  the	  lowest	  performance	  for	  objects	  that	  are	  named	  (one	  shallow	  processing	  task),	  followed	  by	  objects	  where	  a	  colour	  judgement	  is	  made	  (two	  shallow	  processing	  tasks),	  followed	  by	  objects	  for	  which	  preference	  is	  rated	  (one	  shallow	  processing	  task	  and	  one	  deep	  processing	  task).	  	  	   Method	  	  
Participants	  	   Eighteen	  members	  of	  the	  Vanderbilt	  community	  (9	  male;	  mean	  age	  22.5	  years)	  participated	  in	  exchange	  for	  monetary	  compensation.	  Data	  from	  one	  participant	  were	  discarded	  for	  over	  20%	  timeouts	  during	  the	  study	  phase.	  Data	  from	  a	  second	  and	  third	  participant	  were	  discarded	  for	  accuracy	  less	  than	  two	  standard	  deviations	  below	  the	  mean	  on	  the	  naming	  and	  colour	  judgement	  tasks,	  respectively.	  
	  





randomly	  sorted	  into	  three	  sets,	  each	  containing	  seven	  target-­‐lure	  pairs	  from	  each	  category.	  	  
	  
Procedure	  	   The	  procedure	  was	  identical	  to	  Experiment	  3,	  except	  a	  colour	  judgement	  task	  was	  used	  instead	  of	  the	  category	  induction	  task.	  In	  the	  colour	  judgement	  task,	  participants	  pressed	  ‘1’	  if	  the	  object	  in	  the	  picture	  was	  a	  colour,	  and	  ‘2’	  the	  object	  was	  neutral	  (gray/beige/black/white).	  Note	  that	  this	  task	  does	  not	  require	  a	  response	  based	  on	  the	  specific	  colour	  of	  the	  study	  item,	  and	  so	  does	  not	  necessitate	  elaborative	  processing	  of	  the	  specific	  item	  or	  explicitly	  require	  a	  response	  about	  a	  dimension	  that	  might	  be	  relevant	  (although	  a	  target	  and	  lure	  could	  differ	  in	  terms	  of	  colour,	  both	  items	  in	  the	  pair	  were	  either	  two	  different	  colours,	  or	  two	  different	  neutral	  shades).	  	  	   Results	  	  





revealed	  that	  preference	  judgements	  were	  slower	  than	  both	  naming	  and	  colour	  judgements	  (preference	  vs.	  naming:	  t14	  =	  10.074,	  p	  <	  .0001;	  preference	  vs.	  colour:	  t14	  =	  10.007,	  p	  <	  .0001),	  and	  there	  was	  a	  trend	  for	  naming	  judgements	  to	  be	  faster	  than	  colour	  judgements	  (t14	  =	  2.056,	  p	  =	  .059).	  	  Correct	  RTs	  for	  all	  study	  tasks	  are	  reported	  in	  Table	  1.	  	  	  





significant	  difference	  in	  hits	  between	  all	  pairs	  of	  tasks	  (ps	  <	  .01).	  There	  were	  no	  significant	  differences	  in	  false	  alarms5.	  	   There	  were	  no	  significant	  differences	  in	  correct	  RTs	  at	  test	  between	  study	  task	  conditions	  (see	  Table	  2).	  	  	  
	  
Figure	  10.	  a)	  Overall	  performance	  and	  b)	  hit	  and	  false	  alarm	  rates	  on	  the	  recognition	  memory	  task	  in	  Experiment	  5	  for	  objects	  presented	  during	  each	  study	  task	  (naming,	  preference	  judgements,	  colour	  judgements).	  Error	  bars	  show	  95%	  confidence	  intervals	  of	  the	  within-­‐subjects	  effects.	  	   Discussion	  	   The	  results	  of	  Experiment	  5	  reveal	  a	  gradient	  of	  recognition	  memory	  performance	  depending	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  encoding	  task:	  memory	  performance	  was	  greatest	  for	  objects	  for	  which	  preference	  was	  rated,	  followed	  by	  objects	  where	  a	  colour	  judgement	  was	  made,	  and	  memory	  was	  lowest	  for	  objects	  that	  were	  named.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  










naming	  and	  preference	  were	  still	  observed	  under	  randomized	  study	  conditions	  in	  Lupyan	  (2008).	  In	  Experiment	  5	  although	  study	  tasks	  were	  blocked,	  there	  were	  significant	  differences	  in	  response	  times	  (recorded	  from	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  response	  probe)	  that	  match	  the	  pattern	  of	  subsequent	  memory	  performance	  and	  the	  predictions	  based	  on	  depth	  of	  processing:	  naming	  responses	  were	  fastest,	  followed	  by	  colour	  judgements,	  and	  preference	  judgements	  were	  slowest.	  If	  depth	  of	  processing	  manipulations	  only	  exert	  an	  influence	  on	  encoding	  when	  the	  stimulus	  is	  present,	  how	  do	  we	  account	  for	  these	  response	  time	  differences?	  Even	  if	  encoding	  has	  terminated	  when	  participants	  are	  making	  their	  response,	  these	  response	  time	  differences	  must	  still	  correspond	  with	  differences	  in	  processing	  at	  some	  level.	  	  According	  to	  the	  representational	  shift	  hypothesis,	  performance	  should	  be	  worse	  for	  named	  objects	  compared	  to	  all	  other	  tasks,	  but	  there	  are	  no	  predictions	  about	  how	  performance	  should	  differ	  between	  other	  tasks.	  If	  anything,	  the	  representational	  shift	  hypothesis	  predicts	  no	  differences	  between	  other	  study	  tasks	  because	  depth	  of	  processing	  is	  assumed	  not	  to	  be	  involved.	  Moreover,	  the	  representational	  shift	  hypothesis	  cannot	  account	  for	  differences	  in	  study	  response	  times.	  Thus	  the	  results	  of	  Experiment	  5	  are	  more	  consistent	  with	  a	  depth	  of	  processing	  account	  than	  with	  the	  representational	  shift	  hypothesis.	  	  





which	  preference	  judgements	  are	  made	  arise	  because	  preference	  judgements	  





because	  the	  preference	  judgement	  requires	  additional	  processing	  of	  the	  stimulus	  that	  is	  not	  required	  for	  the	  location	  judgement.	  In	  addition,	  if	  naming	  is	  automatic,	  then	  no	  additional	  processing	  of	  the	  stimulus	  should	  be	  required	  to	  generate	  a	  naming	  response,	  so	  naming	  and	  location	  judgements	  should	  have	  equivalent	  effects	  as	  secondary	  tasks,	  leading	  to	  no	  difference	  between	  conditions	  for	  the	  primary	  preference	  group	  (Figure	  11,	  right	  panel).	  Therefore,	  both	  the	  representational	  shift	  account	  and	  depth	  of	  processing	  account	  predict	  a	  between-­‐group	  interaction,	  but	  differ	  in	  the	  precise	  nature	  of	  this	  interaction.	  	  
	  






Participants	  	   Twenty-­‐four	  members	  of	  the	  Vanderbilt	  community	  (9	  male;	  mean	  age	  22.1	  years)	  were	  given	  monetary	  compensation	  in	  exchange	  for	  participation.	  Participants	  were	  randomly	  assigned	  to	  either	  the	  primary	  naming	  (n	  =	  12)	  or	  the	  primary	  preference	  group.	  	  
Stimuli	  	   Stimuli	  were	  the	  same	  chairs	  and	  lamps	  used	  as	  target-­‐lure	  pairs	  in	  Experiment	  1.	  Images	  were	  sorted	  into	  four	  sets	  of	  20	  items	  (five	  target-­‐lure	  pairs	  for	  each	  category).	  For	  each	  participant,	  one	  object	  set	  (counterbalanced)	  was	  designated	  as	  the	  critical	  second	  task	  object	  set.	  	  	  











Study	  Data	  	   Accuracy	  on	  the	  naming	  task	  (whether	  performed	  first	  or	  second)	  and	  the	  location	  task	  were	  all	  above	  96%.	  Preference	  judgements	  were	  more	  reliable	  when	  the	  preference	  judgement	  was	  the	  primary	  task	  (86.5%)	  compared	  with	  when	  the	  preference	  judgement	  was	  the	  second	  task	  (72.5%;	  t22	  =	  2.510,	  p	  <	  .05).	  	  Table	  4.	  
Correct	  Response	  Times	  (and	  Standard	  Deviations)	  Recorded	  from	  the	  Onset	  of	  the	  Response	  





responses	  (t22	  =	  3.114,	  p	  <	  .01).	  Paired-­‐sample	  t-­‐tests	  showed	  that	  location	  judgements	  were	  significantly	  faster	  than	  either	  critical	  second	  task	  (preference	  second:	  t11	  =	  13.706,	  p	  <	  .001;	  naming	  second:	  t11	  =	  21.883,	  p	  <	  .001).	  The	  difference	  in	  RTs	  for	  the	  location	  task	  did	  not	  differ	  between	  primary	  task	  groups.	  	  







Figure	  12.	  a)	  Overall	  performance	  (d’),	  b)	  hit	  rates	  and	  c)	  false	  alarm	  rates	  on	  the	  recognition	  memory	  test	  in	  Experiment	  6	  for	  all	  combinations	  of	  first	  (primary)	  and	  second	  study	  tasks.	  Error	  bars	  show	  95%	  confidence	  intervals	  of	  the	  within-­‐subjects	  effects.	  





Primary	  Task	  interaction	  (F1,22	  =	  9.737,	  p	  <	  .01).	  Paired-­‐sample	  t-­‐tests	  revealed	  that,	  in	  line	  with	  the	  predictions	  based	  on	  depth	  of	  processing,	  there	  was	  no	  difference	  in	  hit	  rates	  between	  the	  two	  second	  tasks	  (location	  and	  naming)	  when	  the	  primary	  task	  was	  preference,	  but	  hit	  rates	  were	  significantly	  lower	  for	  the	  location	  task	  vs.	  secondary	  preference	  task	  when	  the	  primary	  task	  was	  naming	  (t11	  =	  4.280,	  p	  =	  .001).	  Moreover,	  independent	  sample	  t-­‐tests	  indicated	  that	  hit	  rates	  were	  lower	  for	  the	  location	  task	  when	  the	  primary	  task	  was	  naming	  vs.	  when	  the	  primary	  task	  was	  preference	  (t22	  =	  3.537,	  p	  <	  .01),	  while	  the	  hit	  rates	  on	  the	  critical	  second	  task	  trials	  (naming	  and	  preference)	  did	  not	  differ	  between	  groups.	  As	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Figure	  12,	  these	  results	  indicate	  that	  hit	  rates	  were	  the	  same	  for	  any	  condition	  where	  a	  preference	  judgement	  was	  made,	  but	  were	  lower	  for	  the	  single	  condition	  where	  no	  preference	  judgement	  was	  made	  (naming	  followed	  by	  location	  judgement).	  	  	  Table	  5.	  
Correct	  Response	  Times	  (and	  Standard	  Deviations)	  on	  the	  Recognition	  Memory	  Task	  in	  



























the	  shift-­‐to-­‐prototype	  aspect	  of	  the	  representational	  shift	  hypothesis	  that	  the	  correlation	  between	  typicality	  and	  hit	  rates	  is	  used	  to	  support.	  	  





memory	  for	  studied	  items	  increased	  as	  category	  size	  at	  study	  increased.	  The	  authors	  suggested	  that	  this	  may	  occur	  because	  “…the	  studied	  items	  may	  have	  been	  named	  more	  readily…”	  (p.	  570).	  In	  other	  words,	  effects	  of	  category	  size	  were	  presumed	  to	  occur	  due	  to	  implicit	  naming/categorization	  during	  a	  preference	  judgement	  task.	  Whether	  equivalent	  false	  alarm	  rates	  between	  study	  conditions	  is	  due	  to	  implicit	  naming	  could	  be	  investigated	  in	  future	  work	  using	  verbal	  interference	  manipulations.	  If	  naming	  is	  prevented	  or	  reduced	  during	  the	  preference	  judgement	  blocks,	  more	  false	  alarms	  may	  be	  observed	  for	  named	  objects.	  Future	  work	  can	  also	  investigate	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  automaticity	  of	  naming	  influences	  recognition	  memory	  by	  comparing	  performance	  following	  naming	  to	  performance	  following	  passive	  viewing.	  On	  the	  one	  hand	  the	  act	  of	  overtly	  generating	  a	  response,	  even	  one	  where	  the	  response	  itself	  is	  relatively	  automatic,	  may	  increase	  processing	  beyond	  passive	  viewing,	  but	  it	  is	  equally	  possible	  -­‐	  and	  would	  certainly	  be	  a	  challenge	  for	  the	  representational	  shift	  hypothesis	  –	  if	  naming	  and	  passive	  viewing	  did	  not	  differ.	  	  















neural	  evidence	  that	  action	  affordances	  are	  automatically	  activated	  when	  pictures	  of	  objects	  are	  viewed	  (e.g.,	  Ellis	  &	  Tucker,	  2000;	  Grezes,	  Tucker,	  Armony,	  Ellis	  &	  Passingham,	  2003;	  Tucker	  &	  Ellis,	  2000);	  experience	  reaching	  for	  and	  grasping	  objects	  automatically	  prepares	  the	  appropriate	  action	  response.	  However,	  the	  developmental	  studies	  reviewed	  in	  Chapter	  1	  suggest	  that	  verbal	  labels	  have	  a	  special	  status	  in	  infant	  category	  learning,	  and	  this	  advantage	  for	  category	  labels	  appears	  to	  persist	  into	  adulthood	  (e.g.,	  Lupyan	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Yamauchi	  &	  Markman,	  2000).	  Thus,	  it	  may	  be	  that	  verbal	  responses	  to	  objects	  –	  names	  –	  maintain	  a	  special	  status	  throughout	  the	  lifespan,	  and	  naming	  objects	  is	  an	  automatic	  response	  that	  differs	  from	  other	  learned	  automatic	  responses.	  	  	  





identification	  accuracy	  was	  thought	  to	  arise	  because	  this	  recoded	  memory	  representation	  would	  no	  longer	  match	  the	  target	  item	  when	  presented	  at	  test.	  However,	  follow-­‐up	  work	  suggested	  that	  this	  effect	  –	  initially	  described	  in	  terms	  of	  modified	  representations	  –	  occurs	  because	  verbalization	  produces	  a	  general	  processing	  shift	  away	  from	  the	  non-­‐verbal	  processing	  operations	  that	  are	  critical	  to	  face	  recognition	  (see	  Schooler,	  2002,	  for	  a	  review),	  an	  explanation	  that	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  transfer	  appropriate	  processing	  framework.	  Like	  the	  verbal	  overshadowing	  effect,	  decreased	  memory	  for	  named	  objects	  can	  be	  accounted	  for	  by	  a	  general	  principle	  of	  memory	  rather	  than	  a	  task-­‐specific	  explanation.	  	  

















The	  correlation	  between	  typicality	  and	  false	  alarm	  rate	  was	  significant	  for	  objects	  that	  were	  named	  (r80	  =	  .238,	  p	  <	  .05)	  and	  the	  correlation	  approached	  significance	  for	  objects	  for	  which	  preference	  was	  rated	  (r80	  =	  .216	  p	  =	  .054).	  However,	  when	  typicality	  was	  entered	  as	  a	  covariate	  in	  a	  general	  linear	  model	  to	  predict	  false	  alarm	  rates,	  the	  interaction	  between	  typicality	  and	  study	  task	  was	  not	  significant	  (p	  >	  .6).	  	  
Figure	  13.	  Correlation	  between	  Typicality	  and	  Hit	  Rate	  (left)	  and	  Typicality	  and	  False	  Alarm	  Rate	  (right)	  for	  objects	  that	  were	  named	  (black	  circle,	  solid	  line)	  and	  objects	  for	  which	  preference	  was	  rated	  (white	  square,	  dashed	  line)	  during	  the	  study	  phase	  of	  Experiment	  2.	  	   Experiment	  3	  





Average	  typicality	  ratings	  for	  birds	  and	  dogs	  were	  2.58	  and	  2.33,	  respectively.	  The	  difference	  in	  typicality	  ratings	  between	  birds	  and	  dogs	  was	  not	  significant.	  
	  
Figure	  14.	  Correlation	  between	  Typicality	  and	  Hit	  Rate	  (left)	  and	  correlation	  between	  Typicality	  and	  False	  Alarm	  Rate	  (right)	  for	  objects	  	  presented	  during	  naming	  (black	  circle,	  solid	  black	  line),	  preference	  judgement	  (white	  square,	  dashed	  line)	  and	  category	  induction	  (gray	  triangle,	  solid	  gray	  line)	  study	  blocks	  in	  Experiment	  3.	  










significant	  for	  objects	  presented	  during	  exemplar-­‐matching	  (r40	  =	  -­‐.319,	  p	  <	  .05)	  and	  approached	  significance	  for	  objects	  presented	  during	  category-­‐matching	  (r40	  =	  -­‐.295,	  
p	  =	  .064).	  When	  typicality	  was	  entered	  as	  a	  covariate	  in	  a	  general	  linear	  model	  to	  predict	  false	  alarm	  rates,	  the	  interaction	  between	  study	  task	  and	  typicality	  was	  not	  significant	  (p	  >	  .7).	  	  
	  





study	  task	  and	  typicality	  was	  not	  significant	  (p	  >	  .3).	  Interestingly,	  however,	  in	  contrast	  to	  previous	  experiments,	  the	  correlation	  between	  hit	  rate	  and	  typicality	  was	  significant	  for	  preference	  objects	  (r40	  =	  .338,	  p	  <	  .05)	  but	  not	  named	  objects	  (r40	  =	  .137)	  or	  objects	  for	  which	  colour	  judgements	  were	  made	  (r40	  =	  -­‐.046)	  .	  False	  alarm	  rates	  were	  not	  correlated	  with	  typicality	  for	  any	  study	  task,	  nor	  was	  the	  interaction	  between	  study	  task	  and	  typicality	  significant	  when	  typicality	  was	  entered	  as	  a	  covariate	  to	  predict	  false	  alarm	  rates	  (p	  >	  .9).	  	  .
	  





	   Due	  to	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  object	  sets	  were	  assigned	  to	  conditions,	  there	  were	  not	  enough	  data	  points	  per	  object	  to	  calculate	  correlations	  for	  the	  naming/preference	  secondary	  tasks	  and	  the	  location	  secondary	  task	  separately.	  When	  hit	  and	  false	  alarm	  rates	  were	  combined	  for	  both	  secondary	  tasks	  for	  each	  primary	  task	  group	  (see	  Figure	  17),	  the	  correlation	  between	  average	  hit	  rate	  and	  typicality	  approached	  significance	  (r40	  =	  .299,	  p	  =	  .061).	  Although	  the	  correlation	  between	  typicality	  and	  hit	  rate	  was	  significant	  for	  the	  primary	  naming	  group	  (r40	  =	  .325,	  p	  <	  .05)	  but	  not	  the	  primary	  preference	  group	  (r40	  =	  .178),	  	  when	  typicality	  was	  entered	  as	  a	  covariate	  in	  a	  general	  linear	  model	  to	  predict	  hit	  rates,	  the	  interaction	  between	  primary	  task	  and	  typicality	  was	  not	  significant	  (p	  >	  .3).	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